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sábado, 8 de septiembre de 2012

END OF AN ERA: Once-Dominant VC Firm Kleiner Perkins Gets ... - Business Insider

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John DoerrJohn Doerr, Kleiner Perkins

One of the big developments in Silicon Valley in recent years has been a quiet passing of a torch from the venture capital firms that dominated the tech-investing world in the 1990s to a new group that is eating the old group's lunch.

The disruptors, in other words, are getting disrupted.

First and foremost of the firms that have lost a step in recent years is the legendary Kleiner Perkins.

Founded in 1972, Kleiner grew over two decades into one of the world's largest, most powerful, and most successful venture capital firms. In the 1990s, under the direction of partner John Doerr, Kleiner was an early investor in almost all of the huge Internet success stories, including Netscape, AOL, Amazon, and Google. By the end of the decade, the firm's reputation had become so gold-plated that an investment from Kleiner was worth vastly more than the actual money the firm put up: It was a sign that a company was one of the select few Silicon Valley startups that was marked for future world domination.

In the early 2000s, however, Kleiner lost its edge.

The firm missed its chance to invest early in many companies that went on to drive the next wave of Internet development, including Facebook, Twitter, Zynga, LinkedIn, and Groupon. It was also eclipsed by a new breed of more aggressive, creative, and focused investors like Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz of Andreessen Horowitz, Peter Thiel's Founders Fund, Union Square Ventures, Accel Partners, Russian investor DST, and other firms. Punctuating the firm's troubles, Kleiner has also recently become involved in something previously unheard-of in the VC world--a sexual harassment scandal in which one of its senior female partners, Ellen Pao, sued the firm for discrimination.

Last year, in an attempt to cash in on the late-stage "private IPO" investing frenzy, Kleiner startled the Valley by launching a $1 billion late-stage "Digital Growth Fund." Many saw this fund as Kleiner's attempt to play catch-up and associate the firm's name with hot companies it had missed. Some also saw the fund as a sign that Kleiner had lost not just its edge but its valuation discipline and predicted that the firm might get clobbered on some of its late-stage investments.

These concerns were well-founded.

Armed with a boatload of new cash, Kleiner rushed out and made late-stage investments in, among other companies, Facebook, Groupon, Zynga, and Twitter. In most of these investments, moreover, Kleiner did not buy stock from the company--thus providing additional growth capital for the company--but, instead, bought stock from existing investors, helping them cash out with huge gains.

Kleiner's investment in Twitter may yet pay off, but it has been far from a home run.

The firm's late-stage investments in Facebook, Groupon, and Zynga, meanwhile, have been disasters.

Kleiner bought into Facebook at a $52 billion valuation, for example, more than any other institutional investor paid for the stock. In doing so, it helped existing Facebook investors unload $38 million-worth of their own stock.  Facebook's stock roared higher through 2011 and early 2012, leaving Kleiner temporarily in the money. But the stock has collapsed since its May IPO, and Kleiner's investment is now in the red.

Kleiner GrouponSeemed like a good idea at the time.

In February, 2011, Kleiner doubled-down on an early-stage investment in Zynga by helping insiders unload $25 million of stock at $14 a share. Kleiner's earlier investment in Zynga, which was made at $0.42 per share, is still doing fine, but this late-stage bet has been obliterated. Zynga's now trading at $3.

Around the same time, Kleiner also dumped $45 million into Groupon at a $4.5 billion valuation, helping Groupon's early investors cash out in a massive pre-IPO round. For a while, this aggressive bet did fine, with Groupon going public at a $16 billion valuation in late 2011. But now Groupon's stock has collapsed to $4.75 a share, and Kleiner's $45 million investment, made at $7.90 per share, is deeply underwater.

Adding insult to injury, Kleiner is one of firms that invested in that late Groupon round that has held on through the entire stock collapse. Andreessen Horowitz, meanwhile, one of the the firms that has usurped Kleiner's leadership mantle in the Valley in recent years, dumped its own late-stage Groupon investment in June with a modest gain.

Losing money on late-stage "growth investments is not like losing money on early-stage venture bets, which are far more speculative. Late-stage investments are made in companies that are supposed to be much less risky than early venture investments. Offsetting this lower risk are generally lower returns, so valuation discipline is especially important in late-stage investments. And now, like many public-market investors who bought into this latest wave of Internet IPOs, Kleiner is now suffering for buying into late-stage hype and paying prices that were much too high.

Kleiner Perkins's once-pristine reputation has taken a big hit in this latest wave of Internet development. The firm is still run by extraordinarily talented and successful investors, including John Doerr and Ted Schlein, but they are now looking like spectacular athletes who stayed in the game too long and retired long past their primes.

It will be interesting to see if Doerr and Schlein, et al, now rededicate themselves to restoring Kleiner, so they can go out on top. Or whether they will now follow in the footsteps of other Kleiner partners from its "Dream Team" era, such as Vinod Khosla, and quietly move on.

SEE ALSO: Andreessen Horowitz Has Already Dumped Its Groupon Stake

Here's The REAL Reason Twitter's Mobile Ad Revenue Is Crushing ... - Business Insider

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Bloomberg's Katy Finneran just tweeted: "BREAKING: #Twitter's 2012 mobile ad revenue exceeds Facebook's 2012 mobile ad revenue, $129.7 million to $72.7 million."

The numbers, it seems, are based on year-end predictions from eMarketer.

They sound pretty impressive for Twitter and bad for Facebook.

But want to know the real reason for the disparity?

Facebook only started selling mobile ads this summer. Twitter started at the very beginning of the year.

So, actually, it would be pretty embarrassing for Twitter if it ended the year behind Facebook after a six month head-start.

And now for a more important point: eMarketer's numbers should not be trusted.

In this case, they are obviously off.

According to disclosures made by Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg during the company's last earnings call, Facebook mobile ad revenues have reached a $500,000 daily run rate in June.

There are six months between June and the end of the year. 180 or so days. That means Facebook's mobile ad revenues – if they do not grow at all, despite efforts to ramp them up – will come in closer to $90 million than $70 million in 2012.

If you leave this post with one thought, let it be this: eMarketer predictions are a waste of your time.

Smartly, eMarketer makes big, bold predictions that it hopes will get a lot of press, so that lots of media outlets will link to their Web page, where industry people can buy research from eMarketer.

The problem is that eMarketer has an incentive to be controversial, rather than accurate.

In 2007, eMarketer said online video ad spending would reach $4.3 billion in 2011. In 2011, it revised its numbers to $2.16 billion. There are countless examples of whoppers like this from that firm.

(One thing that utterly galls me is how they use such precise decimals. Online video ad spending will not reach about $4 billion in 2011. It will reach four point three billion, thank you very much. Egad, such nonsense.)

There is nothing particularly unethical about this. Lots of small analyst firms have the same marketing model. 

For a more thorough take down of eMarketer's awful prediction-making, read this post from Digiday.

sábado, 1 de septiembre de 2012

There's More Worry About Facebook Beyond Insider Sales And ... - Business Insider

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mark zuckerbergBy Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

GMI Ratings is an independent provider of global corporate governance and ESG ratings and research

RSS Feed Facebook Inc. founder Peter Thiel cashes out with $1 billion. Stakeholders have to ask, is this someone you really want on the board?

By Greg Ruel, Senior Research Associate

On August 20, 2012, an SEC Form 4 form was released for Facebook founding investor and board member Peter Thiel, showing 20 million shares sold for a profit of nearly $400 million. Since May 22, 2012, total company stock sales for the Facebook director have eclipsed $1 billion.

Raising eyebrows, the venture capitalist dumped 80 percent of his remaining shares, essentially cashing out shortly after the required trading lock-down for investors was lifted. At GMI Ratings, we’ve rated the company a solid “D” since its IPO. This divesture news has Facebook on watch as a company likely to join the five percent of companies we rate “F”. To those who have been paying attention since the beginning, the company’s poor governance has been an unmistakable warning sign for investors to take heed, and a clear opportunity to avoid the resulting massive destruction in share price.

If a founder and board member is concerned enough to dump the vast majority of his shares, count us as equally concerned. More, the graphic below displays insider sales since selling restrictions were lifted. Not only have early investors been selling shares since the spring but Mark Zuckerberg himself sold more than $1 billion in shares in May when the stock was worth $37.58.

Mr. Thiel had a plan in place to sell these shares at the time of Facebook’s IPO so the sell-off isn’t likely a direct response to Facebook’s declining share price. It does however speak to the confidence he held in Facebook’s stock price once the company went public. It’s hard to blame an investor for ensuring a profit but it’s more than reasonable to question his inclusion on the board, especially once he essentially liquidates his shares. While his Facebook holdings are now a fraction of what he held before the IPO, he still represents the interests of long-term shareholders and this is troublesome.

There’s more to worry investors beyond insider sales and plummeting share prices. Last month, Facebook posted a fifth consecutive quarter of declining revenue growth. Furthermore, top executives have resigned in droves since the company went public. At the beginning of August, two more executives left the company, citing a desire to take part in more entrepreneurial activities. The Wall Street Journal article points out the conventional wisdom that top talent will often exit a company post-IPO when holdings may be liquidated and they’re free to pursue other endeavors.

Also of significant concern is the make-up of Facebook’s board. We’ve already discussed Mr. Thiel, who is “outside” as defined under Section 162(m) of Internal Revenue Code, but who just dumped $1 billion in shares on the open market. The chairman of the compensation committee, Accel’s James Breyer, is also deemed outside, despite selling about $2.1 billion worth of Facebook stock at the IPO and retaining another 43 million shares of Class A and B stock. Additional “outside” directors include lead director Donald Graham, CEO of The Washington Post, who purchased $4.2 million in advertising from Facebook in 2011, Reed Hastings, CEO of struggling Netflix Inc., and Marc L. Andreessen, the founder of Netscape.

Mr. Andreessen was a founder of Netscape Communication Corporation, a company which has recently drawn comparisons to Facebook for its massive early growth and near complete market share. However, like Facebook, Netscape had difficulty effectively monetizing its massive audience, and the company was eventually acquired by AOL. Facebook relies not only on frequent visits to drive advertising revenue, but also on lengthy stays by its users. However, many game developers are fleeing the popular social network for mobile aps and other platforms due to the increased cost of doing business with Facebook. Game developers, much like advertisers, are still weighing whether the cost of doing business with Facebook is even worth it. The games are crucial to getting Facebook users to spend more time on the site and increasing advertising revenue.

When the board was criticized for a lack of diversity, its rather defiant response was to nominate Sheryl Sandberg to serve as director. Ms. Sandberg is the company’s COO, adding another insider to the board while adding no new expertise to the director slate. All told, Facebook’s board now consists of two inside directors, two large investors, and four more directors who either have substantial related party transactions with the company or who were nominated to the board by Mr. Zuckerberg himself. It’s hard to point to a single director who has the long-term interests of the company’s independent shareholders as their first priority.

Facebook’s dual-class ownership structure is at least as concerning as its board configuration. Mr. Zuckerberg controls about 61 percent of voting shares himself, with insiders and 5 percent holders at nearly 80 percent of vote control. Facebook’s ownership structure gives Mr. Zuckerberg ten votes per share on his Class B holdings while common stock holders have one vote per share. In effect, though the company is now public, Mr. Zuckerberg is ostensibly free to ignore the opinions of common stock shareholders and exert complete control over the company. However, given the management friendly structure of the board, it’s difficult to envision he’ll receive much internal opposition from a board tasked with management oversight.

While we’ll have to wait for Facebook’s first proxy to get more compensation details, what we know so far is concerning. Incentive pay performance targets are unclear and appear to be mostly discretionary and at the will of the Compensation Committee. CEO and other key executive perks are in particular exceptionally high. For example, his 2011 total summary compensation included a discretionary bonus as well as “all other compensation” of $783,529, including personal aircraft use and estate and financial planning perks. Total summary compensation for named executive officers in 2011 included $31 million for recent board appointee and COO Ms. Sandberg, $25 million for Vice President of Engineering Mike Schroepfer, and about $19 million for Chief Financial Officer David A. Ebersman.

Previously, Mr. Zuckerberg received a mega-mega-grant of 120 million stock options in 2005 with an absurdly low exercise price of only $.06. At the company’s IPO, Mr. Zuckerberg exercised 60 million of these options for a profit of $2,276,400,000. To put this number into perspective, 2,021 Russell 3000 companies have market caps smaller than Mr. Zuckerberg’s realized profits.

Furthermore, Facebook has been embroiled in a sea of litigation since establishing themselves as a private company eight years ago, an issue that’s only been exacerbated by and since its disastrous IPO. Most recently on August 17, a U.S. judge rejected Facebook’s proposed settlement in a lawsuit alleging members right’s violations over advertising feature ‘Sponsored Stories.’

In June, Mr. Zuckerberg was sued by his own investors after selling more than $1 billion in company shares just as prices began to fall, sparking insider trading concerns. The lawsuit contends that Mr. Zuckerberg and Facebook knew that advertising revenue could not support the $38 stock valuation, yet selectively told only the company’s largest investors. Most troubling is the mountain of class-action litigation that surrounds the company’s IPO, with numerous lawsuits claiming omission of material information, such as reductions in revenue growth, from the registration and prospectus.

Similarly, a May 28 class-action lawsuit alleges the company informed analysts at the lead underwriters to lower second quarter financial estimates, though the news was kept quiet from the general public. As the news trickled out over May 21 and 22 of this year, Facebook stock lost 18% of its value, causing investors approximately $2.5 billion in losses. Though it’s been trading less than a half year, litigation against Facebook has been immense, and the potential toll on the company and investors is immeasurable.

While Peter Thiel’s $1 billion sell-off was most newsworthy, he wasn’t the only Facebook founder to dump a large batch of shares back on the market this month. Another Facebook co-founder, Dustin Moskovitz, made two separate sales on August 21st and August 24th of 450,000 shares each and was willing to sell for under $20 despite the panicked message such a move sends to the market. With enormous public pressure on the company at the moment, and a halving of the company’s stock price since the IPO, these founders are still willing to sell hundreds of thousands of shares. Facebook’s lock-up period was shorter than that of any of the 40 biggest U.S. technology IPOs since the end of 2010 and insiders have been all too eager to unload these holdings.

Despite an enormous amount of traffic, Facebook has yet to figure out a proper way to monetize clientele. More than that, mounting litigation, a management friendly board, insider cliff sales, compensation arrangements, and a one man fits all ownership structure have Facebook’s ESG rating and stock price simultaneously heading south.

Read more posts on GMI Ratings »

martes, 28 de agosto de 2012

How Facebook Could Generate $7 Billion In Extra Revenue - Business Insider

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Facebook IPOJulia La Roche for Business Insider

At my company, CoRise, we do a lot of postulating, like “What if…?”

I read a piece by Henry Blodget on the possibilities of search revenue for Facebook. 

It’s thought-provoking and I recommend reading it here. This piece really underscores the “optionality” that has made me positive on Facebook before. 

Recently, I spent a good deal of time reaching out to industry pundits to get their opinions on the prospects for Facebook. 

We discussed many topics, possibilities, and the challenges for Facebook to overcome. The one resounding theme that most agreed with was: In the near term Facebook will have to overcome hurdles (ie. the transition to mobile), but with the audience size they reach and the talent at the company, the company has a tremendous long term opportunity that they should be able to execute against. Of course, execution will be everything.

The challenge in investing is trying to look past the current picture to predict what could be. For example, “how big could revenues become?” or “how large could margins be”? or “what competitive moats does the company have around its businesses?” 

These are all important questions that investors ask, but usually the most difficult one is “how big could revenues become?”.  This is so hard to estimate because it requires thinking about what FUTURE businesses the company might enter, not merely extrapolating the current businesses. 

For example, before 2007, did investors think Apple would have a phone, let alone a tablet?  And unfortunately, investors need to think about the potential opportunities BEFORE they're announced – otherwise it’s too late.

This type of thinking has led me to ponder what various business extensions / partnerships / new revenue lines could the company be considering.  Facebook is filled with smart people and they are clearly thinking about these issues – it would be ignorant to assume they are not.  So I wondered, “If I were working at Facebook in the C-suite, Corporate Development or Business Development, what would I be trying to do?”  The following are some areas that I think would make sense for Facebook to be looking into – each one has a few things in common:

1) it does not harm the user experience (and hopefully augments it)

2) it provides a greater utility for a partner / advertiser

3) it is a large opportunity, because of the large audience reach of Facebook

When one sums up the magnitude of these opportunities, it can be staggering – the total can be in the many billions of revenues (FB is expected to only have $5b in revenues this year). Further, most of these opportunities have huge margins, falling directly to the bottom line.

1) Search – $3B Revenue Opportunity

What if Facebook focused on search?  According to AdWeek, Disney and Zynga are already testing the new beta service FB is rolling out. Henry Blodget does a great job covering this in the article I cited above.  Based on the ~500m users that live on Facebook and the ~1.6b searches done each month, he calculates that Facebook could generate ~$1b of incremental revenue immediately.  Further, he calculates that with some tweaks, it could balloon towards $3b of revenues per year.  The best part, it would be almost 100% pure margin (just like it is for AOL today).

2) Commerce – $1B Revenue Opportunity

What if Facebook made a real push into commerce?  I’m not saying that Facebook should start taking on inventory, but what if Facebook cut a deal with Amazon for example and opened up “Facebook Stores” where inventory from Amazon and its affiliates could be viewed / bought.  Amazon would love to tap into Facebook’s ~500m monthly visitors.  Doing some simple math, if only 2% of FB users shop at the store per month and spend an average of $50, that’s $6b on gross revenue per year.  Assuming Facebook gets the typical 15% commission, that almost $1b / per year in pure margin revenues for Facebook (20% boost to current revs)!  And that ONLY assumes a 2% shopping rate of users.

3) Payments - $1B Revenue Opportunity

What if Facebook signed a deal with a credit card company like American Express to offer a discount on Payments for developers?  Facebook could incentivize its developers to prefer Amex, with Amex giving a discount to FB developers. It would be a win for everyone: Amex would get access to FB’s users & developers; developers could offer lower prices to their gamers to augment usage; and FB would drive more game development and users engagement. Payments is still small for Facebook (~$800m runrate), but it’s growing >60% and this could add an accelerant. Further, FB could gain access to AMEX’s legion of small businesses, expanding its reach and engagement. So if the discount on apps encouraged users to sign up for an Amex card (for example), FB could receive a customer referral fee. If just 2% of the user base signs up, at a typical $100 customer acquisition fee, FB could have another $1b business. There are many ways payments for Facebook could blossom, and this is merely exemplary.

4) Distribution (Open Graph) - $1B Revenue Opportunity

App Center – What if Facebook charged developers for app downloads?  Facebook is a massive platform that can provide distribution for almost any consumer-facing product.  In June, Facebook just started rolling out its new AppCenter (it’s primary distribution arm).  This is where free apps can be downloaded and played by users.  Facebook does not monetize this directly yet, but it could by taking a percent of in app advertising, charging per download, or by letting developers pay to appear higher in the search for apps.  So if 10% of FB’s 500m users download 10 apps per year and FB charge the developer $1 per app, that would generate $500m (10% bump on revenues).  The developer is happy because they have a new customer and FB benefits for its distribution.  But what if FB also offered incremental ways for developers to stand out from the sea of apps?  Would the developers be willing to highlight their app vs the others (ie think how eBay allows for sellers to “bold” or “color” their listings for a fee).  This could add significantly to this bucket of revenues.  Of course advertising opportunities only augment this possibility.Subscription Services – What if Facebook charged subscription services for new users it signs up?  Earlier this month, Facebook rolled out Subscription services in the app center – initial customers are Zynga and Kixeye.  Techcrunch did a great piece, on how Facebook could earn millions if it collects the typical 30% surcharge for its distribution of Spotify.  What if FB can get 5% of its 500m users to start a monthly subscription to Netflix, Spotify, Hulu, satellite radio or other digital services?  Assuming an $8/mo subscription price and maybe only a 20% cut of the revenues, FB could generate $500m in annual revenue.  Now what if FB applied that to more traditional media, like magazines, newspapers, cable’s “TV anywhere”?  This could become a multi billion dollar business itself. Reed Hastings, CEO of Netflix, is on FB’s board and recently bought $1m in stock – maybe he understands this?

5) Apple – $1B Revenue Opportunity

What if Facebook and Apple formed a tighter alliance?  Apple is in need of a social strategy, with its Ping product failing. Why does Apple need Facebook?  Apple sells hardware – it’s a one time sale and then the customer is gone. Apple is looking for a network effect, aside from the integration of its various devices. It does not provide a compelling reason for its customers to come back each day and engage. What would that be worth to Apple on product reinforcement basis alone? What about an advertising angle for Apple (especially on mobile with its ad service rumored to not be doing as well as Apple would like).  

It could benefit the Apple app store / iTunes as well. So what if Apple integrated FB more tightly and the network effect of social connections created a small lift to sales (ie there was a benefit to users being on similar hardware, access to iTunes, or being mobile)? Apple sold ~50m units last quarter (ex iPod) or 200m units per year just straight lining.  If they had a 5% lift to sales of these units (10m units) and we assume a $700 mixed ASP, that would generate an incremental $7b to Apple.  If FB takes a 15% commission (referral fee), that could drive another ~$1b in annual revenue. This ignores any lift from advertising, where Apple could hone its mobile ads based on social information. Now, what if FB did this with other hardware vendors as well?

There are many other businesses that I think are also ripe for FB to provide a better service to its users while simultaneously monetizing. However, I think the sketched out above ~$7b revenue opportunity paints the larger thesis: There is a tremendous opportunity in front of Facebook, based on its large, active user base.  What if the company executes on this while continuing to augment the consumer utility?  How would the company’s financials could look vs today?  The risk of course is that the company doesn’t execute and collapses under its own weight.  The company’s valuation has come down significantly to ~16x ‘12 EBITDA and 9x ’12 revenues, according to analyst estimates.  However, without new businesses, that is not cheap given the declining revenue growth.  

To be long here on Facebook, I think an investor must ask themselves, “What if….?”

Disclosure: I own FB shares.  My firm has not done any work with Facebook.

The 10 WORST Celebrity Pages On Facebook - Business Insider

Jonah Hill's Facebook page is pretty bare bones.

It had a lot of potential with his "About" section speaking directly to his mom:

"I wanted to start an official Facebook page to have a direct way to communicate with the awesome people who are interested in communicating with me. That means you, mom.

But seriously, mom, you can't be all over my Facebook page trying to see what I'm up to all the time. I'm an adult and I have my own life and you need to accept that. Seriously."

However, Hill has neglected his page since December of 2011. Where are the jokes, the behind-the-scenes photos, the funny?

Sure, the guy has a total of eight films to keep him busy including upcoming roles in "Django Unchained," "The Wolf of Wall Street," and a sequel to "21 Jump Street"; but, think of all the promotion he could do for these films!

At the very least, Hill could add a coverphoto.

domingo, 26 de agosto de 2012

END OF AN ERA: Once-Dominant VC Firm Kleiner Perkins Gets ... - Business Insider

John DoerrJohn Doerr, Kleiner Perkins

One of the big developments in Silicon Valley in recent years has been a quiet passing of a torch from the venture capital firms that dominated the tech-investing world in the 1990s to a new group that is eating the old group's lunch.

The disruptors, in other words, are getting disrupted.

First and foremost of the firms that have lost a step in recent years is the legendary Kleiner Perkins.

Founded in 1972, Kleiner grew over two decades into one of the world's largest, most powerful, and most successful venture capital firms. In the 1990s, under the direction of partner John Doerr, Kleiner was an early investor in almost all of the huge Internet success stories, including Netscape, AOL, Amazon, and Google. By the end of the decade, the firm's reputation had become so gold-plated that an investment from Kleiner was worth vastly more than the actual money the firm put up: It was a sign that a company was one of the select few Silicon Valley startups that was marked for future world domination.

In the early 2000s, however, Kleiner lost its edge.

The firm missed its chance to invest early in many companies that went on to drive the next wave of Internet development, including Facebook, Twitter, Zynga, LinkedIn, and Groupon. It was also eclipsed by a new breed of more aggressive, creative, and focused investors like Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz of Andreessen Horowitz, Peter Thiel's Founders Fund, Union Square Ventures, Accel Partners, Russian investor DST, and other firms. Punctuating the firm's troubles, Kleiner has also recently become involved in something previously unheard-of in the VC world--a sexual harassment scandal in which one of its senior female partners, Ellen Pao, sued the firm for discrimination.

Last year, in an attempt to cash in on the late-stage "private IPO" investing frenzy, Kleiner startled the Valley by launching a $1 billion late-stage "Digital Growth Fund." Many saw this fund as Kleiner's attempt to play catch-up and associate the firm's name with hot companies it had missed. Some also saw the fund as a sign that Kleiner had lost not just its edge but its valuation discipline and predicted that the firm might get clobbered on some of its late-stage investments.

These concerns were well-founded.

Armed with a boatload of new cash, Kleiner rushed out and made late-stage investments in, among other companies, Facebook, Groupon, Zynga, and Twitter. In most of these investments, moreover, Kleiner did not buy stock from the company--thus providing additional growth capital for the company--but, instead, bought stock from existing investors, helping them cash out with huge gains.

Kleiner's investment in Twitter may yet pay off, but it has been far from a home run.

The firm's late-stage investments in Facebook, Groupon, and Zynga, meanwhile, have been disasters.

Kleiner bought into Facebook at a $52 billion valuation, for example, more than any other institutional investor paid for the stock. In doing so, it helped existing Facebook investors unload $38 million-worth of their own stock.  Facebook's stock roared higher through 2011 and early 2012, leaving Kleiner temporarily in the money. But the stock has collapsed since its May IPO, and Kleiner's investment is now in the red.

Kleiner GrouponSeemed like a good idea at the time.

In February, 2011, Kleiner doubled-down on an early-stage investment in Zynga by helping insiders unload $25 million of stock at $14 a share. Kleiner's earlier investment in Zynga, which was made at $0.42 per share, is still doing fine, but this late-stage bet has been obliterated. Zynga's now trading at $3.

Around the same time, Kleiner also dumped $45 million into Groupon at a $4.5 billion valuation, helping Groupon's early investors cash out in a massive pre-IPO round. For a while, this aggressive bet did fine, with Groupon going public at a $16 billion valuation in late 2011. But now Groupon's stock has collapsed to $4.75 a share, and Kleiner's $45 million investment, made at $7.90 per share, is deeply underwater.

Adding insult to injury, Kleiner is one of firms that invested in that late Groupon round that has held on through the entire stock collapse. Andreessen Horowitz, meanwhile, one of the the firms that has usurped Kleiner's leadership mantle in the Valley in recent years, dumped its own late-stage Groupon investment in June with a modest gain.

Losing money on late-stage "growth investments is not like losing money on early-stage venture bets, which are far more speculative. Late-stage investments are made in companies that are supposed to be much less risky than early venture investments. Offsetting this lower risk are generally lower returns, so valuation discipline is especially important in late-stage investments. And now, like many public-market investors who bought into this latest wave of Internet IPOs, Kleiner is now suffering for buying into late-stage hype and paying prices that were much too high.

Kleiner Perkins's once-pristine reputation has taken a big hit in this latest wave of Internet development. The firm is still run by extraordinarily talented and successful investors, including John Doerr and Ted Schlein, but they are now looking like spectacular athletes who stayed in the game too long and retired long past their primes.

It will be interesting to see if Doerr and Schlein, et al, now rededicate themselves to restoring Kleiner, so they can go out on top. Or whether they will now follow in the footsteps of other Kleiner partners from its "Dream Team" era, such as Vinod Khosla, and quietly move on.

SEE ALSO: Andreessen Horowitz Has Already Dumped Its Groupon Stake

END OF AN ERA: Once-Dominant VC Firm Kleiner Perkins Gets ... - Business Insider

John DoerrJohn Doerr, Kleiner Perkins

One of the big developments in Silicon Valley in recent years has been a quiet passing of a torch from the venture capital firms that dominated the tech-investing world in the 1990s to a new group that is eating the old group's lunch.

The disruptors, in other words, are getting disrupted.

First and foremost of the firms that have lost a step in recent years is the legendary Kleiner Perkins.

Founded in 1972, Kleiner grew over two decades into one of the world's largest, most powerful, and most successful venture capital firms. In the 1990s, under the direction of partner John Doerr, Kleiner was an early investor in almost all of the huge Internet success stories, including Netscape, AOL, Amazon, and Google. By the end of the decade, the firm's reputation had become so gold-plated that an investment from Kleiner was worth vastly more than the actual money the firm put up: It was a sign that a company was one of the select few Silicon Valley startups that was marked for future world domination.

In the early 2000s, however, Kleiner lost its edge.

The firm missed its chance to invest early in many companies that went on to drive the next wave of Internet development, including Facebook, Twitter, Zynga, LinkedIn, and Groupon. It was also eclipsed by a new breed of more aggressive, creative, and focused investors like Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz of Andreessen Horowitz, Peter Thiel's Founders Fund, Union Square Ventures, Accel Partners, Russian investor DST, and other firms. Punctuating the firm's troubles, Kleiner has also recently become involved in something previously unheard-of in the VC world--a sexual harassment scandal in which one of its senior female partners, Ellen Pao, sued the firm for discrimination.

Last year, in an attempt to cash in on the late-stage "private IPO" investing frenzy, Kleiner startled the Valley by launching a $1 billion late-stage "Digital Growth Fund." Many saw this fund as Kleiner's attempt to play catch-up and associate the firm's name with hot companies it had missed. Some also saw the fund as a sign that Kleiner had lost not just its edge but its valuation discipline and predicted that the firm might get clobbered on some of its late-stage investments.

These concerns were well-founded.

Armed with a boatload of new cash, Kleiner rushed out and made late-stage investments in, among other companies, Facebook, Groupon, Zynga, and Twitter. In most of these investments, moreover, Kleiner did not buy stock from the company--thus providing additional growth capital for the company--but, instead, bought stock from existing investors, helping them cash out with huge gains.

Kleiner's investment in Twitter may yet pay off, but it has been far from a home run.

The firm's late-stage investments in Facebook, Groupon, and Zynga, meanwhile, have been disasters.

Kleiner bought into Facebook at a $52 billion valuation, for example, more than any other institutional investor paid for the stock. In doing so, it helped existing Facebook investors unload $38 million-worth of their own stock.  Facebook's stock roared higher through 2011 and early 2012, leaving Kleiner temporarily in the money. But the stock has collapsed since its May IPO, and Kleiner's investment is now in the red.

Kleiner GrouponSeemed like a good idea at the time.

In February, 2011, Kleiner doubled-down on an early-stage investment in Zynga by helping insiders unload $25 million of stock at $14 a share. Kleiner's earlier investment in Zynga, which was made at $0.42 per share, is still doing fine, but this late-stage bet has been obliterated. Zynga's now trading at $3.

Around the same time, Kleiner also dumped $45 million into Groupon at a $4.5 billion valuation, helping Groupon's early investors cash out in a massive pre-IPO round. For a while, this aggressive bet did fine, with Groupon going public at a $16 billion valuation in late 2011. But now Groupon's stock has collapsed to $4.75 a share, and Kleiner's $45 million investment, made at $7.90 per share, is deeply underwater.

Adding insult to injury, Kleiner is one of firms that invested in that late Groupon round that has held on through the entire stock collapse. Andreessen Horowitz, meanwhile, one of the the firms that has usurped Kleiner's leadership mantle in the Valley in recent years, dumped its own late-stage Groupon investment in June with a modest gain.

Losing money on late-stage "growth investments is not like losing money on early-stage venture bets, which are far more speculative. Late-stage investments are made in companies that are supposed to be much less risky than early venture investments. Offsetting this lower risk are generally lower returns, so valuation discipline is especially important in late-stage investments. And now, like many public-market investors who bought into this latest wave of Internet IPOs, Kleiner is now suffering for buying into late-stage hype and paying prices that were much too high.

Kleiner Perkins's once-pristine reputation has taken a big hit in this latest wave of Internet development. The firm is still run by extraordinarily talented and successful investors, including John Doerr and Ted Schlein, but they are now looking like spectacular athletes who stayed in the game too long and retired long past their primes.

It will be interesting to see if Doerr and Schlein, et al, now rededicate themselves to restoring Kleiner, so they can go out on top. Or whether they will now follow in the footsteps of other Kleiner partners from its "Dream Team" era, such as Vinod Khosla, and quietly move on.

SEE ALSO: Andreessen Horowitz Has Already Dumped Its Groupon Stake